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THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS-
WHO WILL DELIVER THE BABIES OF
TODA Y, THE LEADERS OF TOMORROW?
By: Lauren Elizabeth Rallo"
"The nation's health care system is confronting a crisis."'
Throughout the country, obstetricians have refused to take new
patients,2 and some have even refused to deliver the pregnant women
to whom they were providing prenatal care.3 Skyrocketing medical
liability premiums are forcing doctors in high-risk specialty areas, such
as obstetrics, to stop practicing medicine.4
In order to save our health care system and its patients, action must
be taken by Congress. Currently, Republicans in Congress have
proposed the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare
(HEALTH) Act in response to the crisis.5 Although not passed into
law, the HEALTH Act is the first federal statute that has the ability to
tame the out of control malpractice premiums doctors are now forced
to pay.
. J.D. candidate, 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; B.A. 2001 Miami University (Ohio). The author wishes to thank her fianc6,
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1. Review and Outlook, Health Reform, Piece by Piece, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
2002, at A25.
2. Lawyers v. Patients, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at A14 (op-ed article); see
also Marilyn Elias, Obstetricians Dwindle Amid High Malpractice Costs, USA
TODAY, May 6, 2002, at D8.
3. Kamal Wallace, More Doctors Getting Out of the Baby Delivery Business
(May 30, 2002), at www.WRAL.com/health/1487393/detail.html. "Dr. John
Schmitt is leaving 2,000 patients partly because of the skyrocketing cost of medical
liability insurance, which went up 150 percent from last year. Obstetrics is a high-
risk specialty." Id.; see also Rita Rubin, Fed-up Obstetricians Look for a Way Out,
USA TODAY, July 1, 2002, at D1; Elias, supra note 2.
4. See Rubin, supra note 3.
5. The Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act of 2003,
H.R. 5, 108th Cong. §4(b) (2003).
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This comment will focus on the problem of escalating medical
malpractice liability insurance premiums and the concomitant effects
on physicians, particularly those specializing in obstetrics. Part I
establishes that excessive jury awards in medical malpractice lawsuits
have caused the current crisis in America's health care system.
Particular attention will be paid to states that have experienced a
virtual exodus of physicians, and this comment will argue that fear of
liability without limits is the cause of this exodus. Part II will discuss
the success of California's venture to limit malpractice liability and
curtail medical malpractice insurance premises. This comment argues
that California serves as the model for other states to follow. In
contrast, Part III discusses New Hampshire's failed attempt to limit
medical malpractice liability. This comment uses New Hampshire's
failure as an invitation for Congress to enact statutory reform that
would be binding on the States pursuant to Congress' preemption
power in the Constitution. Part IV thus examines the Federal
government's proposed response to the medical malpractice crisis and
argues that Congress has the authority to promulgate tort reform
legislation to curtail the medical malpractice problem. If the Federal
government does not act in this manner, there will be a lack of doctors
to deliver the leaders of tomorrow and the mothers of today.
I. THE CURRENT PROBLEM
In the past thirty years, "[m]edicine has been transformed. It's as if
someone smashed the vial containing professional judgment. Legal
fear has a 'corrosive effect' on the doctor-patient relationship ... as
'physicians, in a corner of their minds, regard patients as potential
medical malpractice claimants.",6  As liability insurance premiums
increase at alarming rates,7 many obstetricians find that they cannot
8
afford to deliver babies. Without liability insurance most states will
not allow doctors to practice medicine; therefore, as rates continue to
6. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD 24-25 (2001).
7. Trends in 2002 Rates for Physicians' Medical Professional Liability
Insurance, MEDICAL LIABILITY MONITOR, October, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Trends
in 2002]. Medical Liability Monitor is a journal which deals exclusively with
medical professional liability and which has been published since 1990.
8. Press Release, The American College of Obstetrician and Gynecologists,




rise drastically,9 doctors leave the profession, retire early, or move to
states with lower liability insurance premiums or more hospitable legal
systems.10
The American College of Obstetrician and Gynecologists (ACOG)
has identified nine "Red Alert" hot states1 where patient care may
soon be jeopardized because of the insurance crisis facing America's
doctors. 12 These nine "hot states" include Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and
Washington.13  These are all states in which liability insurance
premiums are driving doctors out of the state14 or completely out of the
practice of medicine.15
Insurance companies argue that the rates of high-risk specialty
doctors have to be increased because of excessive jury awards to
injured patients. One example involves a five-year-old child who
suffered injuries during birth. A New Jersey jury awarded the family
9. See Trends in 2002, supra note 7, at 1-16.
10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFRONTING THE
NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING
COSTS BY FIXING OUT MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM (2002) 1 [hereinafter HHS
REPORT].
11. Press Release, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
Nation's Obstetrical Care Endangered by Growing Liability Insurance Crisis (May
6, 2002) available at http://www.acog.org/from-home/publications/pressreleases/
nr05-06-02-1.cfm [hereinafter Obstetrical Care Endangered]; see also Robert S.
McIlwain, Federal Tort Reform Needed to Save Delivery Rooms, PHYSICIAN'S
WEEKLY, July 1, 2002, at http://www.physweekly.com/index.asp?issueid=24
(focusing on Pennsylvania's medical liability crisis and the alarming rate at which
doctors premiums are increasing). Pennsylvania is one of the nine "Red Alert"
states listed by the ACOG in May, 2002. Id.
12. See Obstetrical Care Endangered, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. HHS REPORT, supra note 10, at 2. Dr. Edwards was forced to close her
obstetrics practice in Las Vegas because her insurance premium jumped from
$37,000 to $150,000 in one year. She had moved her practice to West Los Angeles,
California. California's MICRA Act caps non-economic damage awards at
$250,000, which has helped to keep medical malpractice insurance at affordable
rates. Id.; see also Joelle Babula, Doctors Group's Petition Forces Legislature to
Consider Proposal, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Dec. 3, 2002, at lA.
15. Health Care Litigation Reform: Does Limitless Litigation Restrict Access to
Health Care?: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Commercial Administrative
Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 22-24 (2002) (statement
of Donald J. Palmisano, MD, JD, Secretary-Treasurer, American Medical
Association) [hereinafter Palmisano Congressional Statement].
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$84 million. 16 The cause of drastically high jury awards can usually be
correlated to how convincing or likeable the plaintiff's attorney can
be.17 Catherine Crier in The Case Against Lawyers asserts, "Litigation
is no longer a crapshoot, it is becoming a sure thing.... Human life is
now quantified in astronomical terms. In 1999 the ten biggest jury
awards to individual plaintiffs totaled almost $9 billion - three times
the amount in 1998. One verdict delivered $1.2 billion to the family of
[a woman who died after a go-cart accident].' '
The beginning of 2003 saw a surgeon walkout in West Virginia.' 9
The surgeons chose not to renew their contracts which had expired on
December 31, 2002, in protest to soaring medical malpractice
insurance costs. The surgeon walkout caused elective surgeries in
"northern West Virginia [to be] canceled or . . . moved. In
Pennsylvania, a similar walkout was averted."20 The nine "hot states"
have all attempted to fix the problem of ever increasing liability
premiums; however, most of the legislation enacted by these states will
have a difficult time surviving state constitutionality challenges.1 One
state that has placed an effective cap on non-economic damages is
California.22 California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA) of 1975 has not only passed legal challenges by trial lawyers,
it is also viewed as the most "successful model of reform.
23
In order to fully understand how the crisis has affected patients and
doctors throughout the country, a brief look at three "Red Alert" hot
states - Mississippi, Nevada and Pennsylvania - will illustrate the
severity of the crisis.
16. Fran Wood, Doctors Pained By Insurance Crisis, THE STAR-LEDGER (New
Jersey), Feb. 2, 2003, at 3.
17. Id.
18. CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS 9 (2002).
19. Associated Press, Surgeons Walk Out in West Virginia, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2,
2002) at D4.
20. Id.
21. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d
825 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Baptist Hospital
of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App. 1984).
22. Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation:
Hearing Before House Energy and Commerce Committee, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Mr. Stuart H. Fine, CEO, Grand View Hospital).
23. Mcllwain, supra note 11.
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A. Mississippi
In December 2002, the Mississippi state legislature voted to
tighten rules on where cases can be tried, cap punitive damage
awards, limit the state's joint-and-several liability rule so that
companies with little blame can't be soaked as deep pockets, bar
advertising by attorneys who aren't licensed to practice in
Mississippi and slap a fine on the filing of frivolous lawsuits.24
This legislation was passed in response to a doctor shortage in the state
which started months before any legislative action took place) 5
In Mississippi, the crisis is evident by the more than half of all
physicians who have left the profession in the Delta region.26 The doors
to clinics and medical offices are being closed because the doctors'
liability insurance is routinely cancelled.27 These are doctors who had
initially chosen to practice in rural towns throughout Mississippi but
have been forced to close their doors because their malpractice
insurance was cancelled.
The increase in cost has led more than half of the medical doctors in
Mississippi to stop practicing in the state.2 Although challenging to
any state, this is particularly devastating to Mississippi which has one
of the lowest doctor-to-patient ratios in the United States.29 The
American Medical Association (AMA) found that there were "152
practicing physicians per 100,000 people in . . . Mississippi. '"3°
Mississippi is suffering from a persistent shortage of doctors
throughout the state, particularly in rural communities. In fact, few
24. Miracle in Mississippi, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2002, at A22; see also Tim
Lemke, Mississippi Restricts Lawsuit Damages, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at Al.
25. Tanya Albert, Accepting No Deliveries: Obstetricians are Hard to Find in
the Mississippi Delta., AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 9, 2002, at 15-16 [hereinafter No
Deliveries]; see also Wendy McElroy, Law Suites Fueling Care Crisis, at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,52684,00.html (May 14, 2002).
26. McElroy, supra note 25. Patients who were able to walk or drive a short
distance for their prenatal check-ups now have to drive at least forty-five minutes
to the nearest obstetrician-gynecologist. Id.
27. Id.
2& Id.
29. Id. "Mississippi ranks 50 out of 51 states in the nation for the number of
physicians per 100,000." Id.
30. Id.
2004]
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cities under 20,000 have a practicing obstetrician. For example, Yazoo
City, with a population of 14,550, has no practicing obstetricians.31
The drastic cost increase and subsequent loss of liability insurance is
due in part to "'forum shopping,' by which plaintiffs' attorneys
deliberately file their cases in counties known to award high damages -
even if the case originates elsewhere. 3 2  The practice of forum
shopping is becoming more common because of excessive jury awards
by Mississippi juries.
B. Nevada
Nevada approved legislation33 providing a $350,000 cap on damages
for pain and suffering which can only be exceeded if there is clear and
convincing evidence that this amount is insufficient. 4 However, this
legislation arose only after the state found itself with a virtual exodus
of doctors.35 Doctors in all specialties, especially high-risk specialties,
have been leaving the profession because of the considerable increase
in malpractice awards. 36 The insurance rates in Nevada were extremely
high in the summer of 2002, as obstetricians were paying an average
medical malpractice premium of $108,000, representing a one-third
increase from the previous year.37
The bill passed by the Nevada legislature was needed as doctors
continue to feel the pinch of high liability insurance which has not
31. ACOG Fact Sheet, Red Alert: The Hot States (May 6, 2002), available at
www.acog.org/from-home/publications/press-release.nr05-06-05-2.cfm
[hereinafter ACOG Fact Sheet].
32. McElroy, supra note 25.
33. Assemb. B. 1, 18h Spec. Sess. (Nev. 2002). This bill was passed during a
special legislative session of Nevada's Legislature.
34. Joelle Babula, Health Care: Governor Signs Liability Bill, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., Aug. 8, 2002, at lB. Preponderance of the evidence is the normal standard for
awarding damages in a civil case.
35. Palmisano Congressional Statement, supra note 15, at 3.
36. Id. "Doctors have been shutting down their practices, retiring early or
limiting their service because they cannot find malpractice insurance or afford the
skyrocketing rates." Id.
37. Steve Friess, Liability Costs Drive Doctors from Practice, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, July 17, 2002, at 15-16. Although $108,000 is not the highest
amount paid for malpractice insurance, it is high enough to require some doctors
to take out loans to pay their insurance premiums. Id.
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decreased as a result of the legislative measures thus far taken.38
Instead, "One company raised Nevada malpractice base rates 25
percent last month [December 2002] and others have since requested
increases of 93 percent and 17 percent."3 9 The malpractice insurance
rates that doctors in Nevada are paying will not decrease until the new
legislation is challenged and upheld by the Nevada Supreme Court.
Such challenges generally take years to make it up to the state supreme
court as a result of the lengthy appellate processes. The insurance
companies have seen numerous other states attempt to pass similar
pieces of legislation which are then struck down by the highest state
courts.4
C. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania ranks second highest in the nation for total payouts for
medical liability - $352 million in fiscal year 2000.4' Although it had
been delivering babies since its inception in 1892, Methodist Hospital
of South Philadelphia was forced to stop providing this service.4 2 The
hospital indicated in its press release that it would continue to provide
prenatal care to its patients, but that all deliveries would take place at
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital.
43
Pennsylvanians almost suffered the fate of their neighbors in West
Virginia until, in late 2002, Governor-elect Ed Rendell announced a
proposal which halted a planned doctors strike."4 Rendell "appointed a
special commission to consider short-term aid packages that would
38. Ryan Pearson, Nevada Legislature Takes Fresh Look at Malpractice Laws,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Jan. 16, 2003. In fact, the legislative reform "had
no immediate effect, mainly because insurers say it's uncertain whether the law
will withstand legal challenges." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. ACOG Fact Sheet supra note 31, at 2.
42. Press Release, Methodist Hospital Division Thomas Jefferson University
Hospital, South Philadelphia Feels the Effect of Medical Malpractice Premium
Increases (April 24, 2002) (on file with the author).
43. Id. (stating that Thomas Jefferson University Hospital is located twenty
blocks north of Methodist Hospital).
44. Surgeons Threaten Walkout Over Insurance Costs, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 27, 2002, available at www.colaco.net/3/healthinsurance.htm.
2004]
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The Pennsylvania Medical Society Alliance 46 published statistics in
2002 that not only shocked the state of Pennsylvania but also the
nation. The report found that in 2001, Pennsylvania Hospitals paid
over $180 million in additional premiums compared to the previous47
year. These figures were a main reason why the "number of
practicing obstetricians dropped 18% in the years 1997-2000. ",48 The
large rate increases in Pennsylvania are a direct result of "multiple
verdicts in excess of $50,000,000 in just the past two years. 49 Insurance
companies claim that it is jury awards that force them to increase
premiums paid by doctors.50
The nine "hot states" have all tried to fix the problem of increasing
liability premiums; however, most of the legislation enacted by these
states will have a difficult time passing state constitutionality
challenges.5 A state that has placed an effective cap on non-economic
damages is California. 2  California's law not only passed legal
challenges but also is viewed as the most "successful model of reform,"
because it has withstood state constitutional challenges. 3
45. Id.
46. The Pennsylvania Medical Society Alliance is a consortium of medical
practitioners and insurance companies which tracks important data, such as
medical liability costs. See http://www.pamedsoc.org/Template.cfm?section=The-
Society (last visited May 15, 2004).
47. Mcllwain, supra note 11.
48. Id.
49. Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation:
Hearing on H.R. 4600 Before House Comm. On Energy and Commerce Health,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Richard Anderson, M.D., CEO, The Doctor's
Company) [hereinafter Anderson statement].
50. Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical Litigation: Joint Hearing Before
the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Senator Judd Gregg, Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions).
51. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital, 347 N.E.2d 736 (I11. 1976);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d
825 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Baptist Hospital
of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App. 1984).
52. Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation:
Hearing before the House of Representative Energy and Commerce Committee,
107th Cong (2002) (statement of Mr. Stuart H. Fine, CEO Grand View Hospital).
53. Mcllwain, supra note 11.
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II. A REFORMED STATE: CALIFORNIA
The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) was
enacted by the California legislature in 19754 in an effort to ameliorate
a medical liability insurance crisis.55 The legislature enacted eight
different civil code sections56 to effect one of the largest overhauls of
medical liability insurance.57 The California Legislature was
acting in a situation in which it had found that the rising cost of
medical malpractice insurance was posing serious problems for
the health care system in California, threatening to curtail the
availability of medical care in some parts of the state and
creating the very real possibility that many doctors would
practice without insurance, leaving patients who might be
injured by such doctors with the prospect of uncollectible
58judgments.
Each section of the statute concerns a specific problem which arose in
the mid-1970s with respect to soaring liability insurance premiums."
To understand the proposed Federal legislation, it is necessary to
discuss each section of MICRA.6
A. California Civil Code Section 3333.1, Negligence of health care
provider; evidence of benefits and premiums paid; subrogation
This section of MICRA is extremely important because it provides
the following:
54. American Bank and Trust v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos, 683 P.2d
670, 674 (Cal. 1984).
55. Id. at 673.
56. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3333.1, 3333.2,667.7, 340.5, 1295, 6146 (West 2002).
57. Michigan has modeled its tort reform after MICRA, but it has not been as
successful in keeping premiums affordable to doctors as MICRA has been in
California. See Patricia J. Fowler, Medical Liability Insurance: Another Costly
Crisis, MSU FACULTY PERSPECTIVES, 2002 (on file with the author).
58. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665,680 (Cal. 1985).
59. Anderson statement, supra note 49.
60. Id. The HEALTH Act of 2003 is closely related to California's MICRA
Act. The Act was intentionally drafted this way because not only has MICRA
been successful in keeping down the cost of malpractice liability insurance for
California doctors, it has withstood the test of the California Supreme Court. Id.
20041
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the defendant ... may produce evidence of any amount payable
as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the personal injury
pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, any state or
federal income disability or worker's compensation act, any
health, sickness or income-disability insurance, accident
insurance that provides health benefits or income-disability
coverage, and any contract or agreement of any group,
organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or
reimburse the cost of medical, hospital, dental, or other health
61
care services.
In other words, this code section gives judges the power to reduce a
62jury verdict award by any amount contributed by a collateral source.
A collateral source generally refers to any source of payments other
than from the defendant which compensates a plaintiff for damagesS 63
suffered as a result of the defendant's alleged wrongdoing. The
purpose of this provision in MICRA, which, for purposes of discussion
will be referred to as the "contra-collateral source provision," is to
avoid "'double recovery' obtained by plaintiffs who have their medical
expenses paid by their own health insurance and still obtain damages
for such expenses from defendant tortfeasors." 6 The contra-collateral
source provision in MICRA is one part of the act which was meant as a
means of reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums
paid by doctors. Not allowing victims to recover monies that their
insurance company has already paid in medical expenses was thought
to help lower jury awards and thus the premiums paid by doctors.65
This provision is important because it illustrates that California is
treating medical malpractice suits differently than other tort cases. In
suits that do not fall under state medical malpractice statutes, victims
are entitled to be fully compensated by the tortfeasor.
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1(a) (West 2002).
62. See id.
63. See Health Coalition on Liability and Access, Cost Saving Elements of the
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) (Oct. 18, 2002)
[hereinafter HCLA], available at www.hcla.org/solution.htm. HCLA is a coalition
united in bringing greater fairness and cost-effectiveness to federal health liability
laws. This organization believes that legal reform is the best way to protect medical
progress and to ensure that affordable health care is accessible to all Americans.
Id. An example of a collateral source would be a workers' compensation fund,
which pays for expenses incurred by employees who are injured. The code would
prohibit defendants from collecting once from their workers compensation fund
and again from the plaintiff doctor.
64. Barme v. Wood, 689 P.2d 446, 449 (Cal. 1984).
65. Id. at 448-49.
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Section 3333.1 of the California Civil Code was challenged in the
case of Barme v. Wood,"' where a wife brought suit on behalf of her
husband for medical malpractice after he suffered brain damage
following open heart surgery. 67 The husband, a police officer, had
insurance through the city, which was a self-insurer. 68 In response the
city filed a complaint in intervention to recover the expenses incurred
by providing workers' compensation benefits to the officer.69
In Barme, the California Supreme Court held that the contra-
collateral source provision of MICRA did not violate due process or
equal protection under the California Constitution7° because "the due
process clause does not demand that the Legislature invariably allocate
liability on a negligence or fault basis., 71 The California Supreme
Court in Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit District72
explained that the rationale underlying the traditional collateral source
rule excludes evidence of collateral source benefits:
This reasoning does not apply to workers' compensation
benefits, because under California law plaintiffs have not been
permitted to obtain a double recovery of such benefits. Either
the employer has been entitled to obtain reimbursement from
the tort recovery or the tort judgment has been reduced by the
applicable workers' compensation benefits obtained by the
employee.73
The court explained that by requiring a defendant in medical
malpractice cases to reimburse workers' compensation or health
insurance costs, many insurance companies would quickly exit the
medical liability field, leaving a large number of doctors uninsured.74
In dictum, the court observed that the legislature did not intend for the
plaintiff's insurance or workers' compensation to be reimbursed. 75 By
not allowing the plaintiff's insurance company to be reimbursed,
MICRA allows for the high cost of medical bills and wages to be paid
by someone other than the negligent doctor or his insurance provider.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 447.
68. Id. at 447-48.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 450.
71. Id.
72. 465 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1970).
73. Barme, 689 P.2d at 449 n.5 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 449.
75. Id.
2004]
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B. Section 3333.2, Negligence of heath care provider; non-economic
losses; limitation
The heart of the MICRA statute is embodied in Section 3333.2. This
section places a limit on the amount of money a plaintiff can receive
for non-economic losses. The statute states that "[i]n no action shall
the amount of damages for non-economic losses exceed two hundred
fifty thousand dollars ($250,000). ",16  Therefore, the plaintiff will
recover a judgment lower than the actual jury award in the event that
the jury awards over $250,000 in non-economic damages.7 By placing
a cap on the amount of money an insurance company may have to pay,
these companies are able to lower medical malpractice premiums paid
by doctors, which in turn keeps medical doctors working in
California.8
Non-economic damages are commonly defined as pain, suffering,
inconvenience, disfigurement and other non-pecuniary damages.7 9 The
cap in this section of the statute only applies to non-economic
damages, not pecuniary damages, such as lost wages or medical
expenses." As the Health Coalition on Liability and Access described
it, the MICRA cap on non-economic damages "would guarantee full
and unlimited recovery of a patient's economic damages: medical
expenses, lost wages,.., and so on. These reforms would reasonably
limit only the non-economic portion of an award."'"
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,n the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the cap on non-economic damages imposed by
MICRA. With a statutory cap on non-economic damages mandated,
the trial judge has the authority, and in fact is required, to reduce any
76. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2002).
77. 695 P.2d 665,669 (Cal. 1985).
78. For example, if a jury awards a plaintiff one million dollars in non-
economic damages, this state statute requires the judge to limit the amount of non-
economic damages from one million dollars to two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars. This eliminates the insurance industry's fear of million dollar non-
economic awards to plaintiffs and, theoretically, should prompt them to lower
premiums paid by doctors.
79. Noneconomic damages are defined as "subjective, non-monetary losses
including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering,
emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to
reputation and humiliation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2, subd (b)(2) (West 2002).
80. Fein, 695 P.2d at 681.
81. HCLA, supra note 63.
82. Fein, 695 P.2d at 665.
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jury verdict awarding a plaintiff non-economic damages exceeding
83$250,000. In Permanente, the Supreme Court of California held that
"placing a ceiling of $250,000 on the recovery of noneconomic
damages is rationally related to the objective of reducing the costs of
malpractice defendants and their insurers. ' 84 The California Supreme
Court also found that "'[s]o long as the measure is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest, policy determinations as to the need for, and
the desirability of, the enactment are for the Legislature."' 8
Therefore, since the Legislature restricted non-economic damages, the
court refused to act, finding instead that section 3333.2 was "rationally
related to legitimate state interests."86 It is important to note that the
California Supreme Court did not look at the cap placed on non-
economic damages from a public policy perspective. Instead, the court
affirmed the legislature's law-making ability as being rationally related
to how the legislature wanted to solve the crisis in the mid-1970s.
C. Section 667.7, Action against health care provider; periodic payments
of future damages; contempt; legislative intent
Sections 667.7 and 3333.2 of the California Civil Code are closely
related as they both concern a money-related, legislatively imposed
cap. Whereas section 3333.2 placed a cap on non-economic damages,
section 667.7 allows for periodic payments of any award for future
earnings exceeding $50,000." The Code requires that the award
exceed $50,000 in future damages and that the court must "make a
specific finding as to the dollar amount of periodic payments" 88 and
"the court shall require the judgment debtor who is not adequately
insured to post security adequate to assure full payment of such
damages awarded by the judgment."89 Along with requiring the court
to make a finding as to the specific dollar amount of the future
payments, it also has to specify the "interval between payments, and
the number of payments or the period of time over which payments
83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2.
84. Fein, 695 P.2d at 680.
85. Id.; Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty. Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 683
P.2d 670, 678 (Cal. 1984).
86. Fein, 695 P.2d at 680.
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shall be made" 9 and that "[s]uch payment shall only be subject to
modification in the event of the death of the judgment creditor."9' The
statue further provides that if a court finds that the debtor fails to
make payments to the creditor (plaintiff), the debtor will be found in
contempt and forced to pay the damages.92 The "loss of future
earnings shall not be reduced or payments terminated by reason of the
death of the judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom -
the judgment creditor owed a duty of support ... immediately prior to
his death";93 however, "upon petition of any party in interest, [the
court may] modify the judgment to award and apportion the unpaid
future damages in accordance with this subdivision." 94 The intent of
the California legislature was to eliminate a windfall from a lump-sum
95
recovery.
This statutory provision allows a defendant to purchase an annuity
paying a set sum for a stated length of time. This form of payment
ensures that the plaintiff will have money for health care as needed for
the rest of his life expectancy and will help keep premiums stable.
96
The Supreme Court of California has ruled that a large award is
usually spent or poorly invested before the injured plaintiff incurs the
medical expense or earnings loss which the award was intended to
cover.7  Jury awards, however, are meant to compensate victims
throughout their life for losses they sustain as a result of the
malpractice. The court noted that this structured pay-out eliminated a
windfall to plaintiffs' heirs and only compensated the victim for
sustained losses.98
In American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, the
plaintiff claimed that section 667.7 of the California Civil Code
violated the state constitution's promise of equal protection." The
California Supreme Court held that "there can be no question but that
- from the information before it - the Legislature could rationally have
decided that the enactment might serve its insurance cost reduction
90. Id. § 667.7(b)(1).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 667.7(b)(2).
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7(c) (West 2002).
94. Id.
95. Id. §667.7(f).
96. HCLA, supra note 63.
97. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 683 P.2d at 676.
98. Id. at 678.
99. Id. at 677.
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objective."' °  With its decision in American Bank, the court began
employing a rational basis test when evaluating any provision of
MICRA. If one could rationally conclude that the provision passed by
the Legislature would accomplish the goals set forth, then the
provision was rational, and there was no violation of equal protection
because the court concluded that the state legislature had rationally
decided to limit awards. 1"
The plaintiff in American Bank also claimed that section 667.7 was
unconstitutional because it impaired his constitutional right to a jury
trial.' °2 The court held that "new procedures better suited to the
efficient administration of justice may be substituted if there is no
impairment of the substantial features of a jury trial."'0 3 The court
concluded that section 667.7 "should be interpreted to require the jury
to designate the portion of its verdict that is intended to compensate
the plaintiff for future damages,"' 4 and that the court's ability to
structure the payments does not infringe upon a plaintiff's right to trial
by jury."
D. Section 340.5, Action against health care provider, three years from
injury or one year from discovery exceptions; minors
Section 340.5 changes the statute of limitations period during which
California patients may bring suit by stating "the time for the
commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or
one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first."' 6
This section of MICRA is designed to protect health care providers
from having suits brought against them years after an alleged wrongful
act.
There are two time requirements which an adult must satisfy in
order to file a malpractice suit.'07 Even if an adult brings an action
100. Id. at 681.
101. Id. at 681 (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 466
(1984)).
102. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 683 P.2d at 681; CAL.CONST., art. I, § 16.
103. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 683 P.2d at 681.
104. Id. at 681.
105. Id.
106. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 2002).
107. HCLA, supra note 63.
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within three years from the date of injury, he or she must still satisfy
the one year "reasonable discovery" period.'O° However, even if the
adult was to file suit within one year of "reasonable discovery," the
action can still be barred if the one-year time limitation has expired.' °
When dealing with minors, the timing requirements to file a suit are
different. Specifically, a suit "shall be commenced within three years
from the date of the alleged wrongful act except that action by a minor
under the full age of six years shall be commenced within three years
or prior to his eighth birthday[,] whichever provides a longer period.""
However, these timing requirements are inapplicable if the case
involves fraud, intentional concealment, or the presence of a foreign
body."'
E. Section 1295, Contract for medical services; mandatory provision;
waiver of right to sue; form of notice; nature of contract
This section of MICRA allows for a clause to be inserted into
contracts for medical services, stating,
It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that
is as to whether any medical services rendered under this
contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly,
negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by
submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not
by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law
provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both
parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their
constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court
of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of
arbitration."'
The use of arbitration, as opposed to going to trial, allows for medical
malpractice disputes to be resolved with reduced economic cost to
both parties and is usually more expedient than traditional court





112. CAL. CIv PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1981).
113. See Arbitration vs. Lawsuits, National Arbitration Forum, Forum
Whitepaper Series (on file with author).
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and money through arbitration, plaintiffs do as well. Trials usually
take years and verdicts are often appealed, whereas arbitration takes a
shorter period of time and is more cost efficient.'
14
F. Section 6146, Limitations; periodic payments
This section of MICRA deals specifically with the pay structure of
the legal fees of plaintiffs' counsel. In particular, this section does not
allow attorneys to contract with plaintiffs on a contingency fee basis.
Instead, the statute sets a pay schedule stating the percentage of the
total recovery to which the attorney is entitled. Attorneys are unable
to contract around these provisions in order to gain more money.
Rather, they are only entitled to 40 percent on the first $50,000; 33.3
percent on the next $50,000; 25 percent on the next $500,000 and only
15 percent on any amount which exceeds $600,000."' Moreover, if
either party elects to have periodic payments made pursuant to section
667.7, then the court must place a "total value on these payments
based upon the projected life expectancy of the plaintiff and include
this amount in computing the total award from which attorney's fees
are calculated.
1 1 6
The reasoning behind the rate structure limitation was to allow a
greater portion of a settlement or jury award to go directly to the
plaintiff."7 Consequently, this fee schedule has been challenged in the
California state courts. Attorneys, and at times their clients, assert that
the rate structure set by section 6146 is inadequate and may have a
detrimental effect on the willingness of attorneys to take medical
malpractice cases.
In Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc.,"8 the Supreme Court of
California held that section 6146 is constitutional." 9 The plaintiff in
this case claimed that it was a violation of due process rights and a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine under the California
constitution.1 2 0 The court responded that it knew "of no authority
which suggests that due process requires a single, uniform attorney fee
114. Id.
115. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1993).
116. Id.
117. HCLA, supra note 63.
118. Roa v. Lodi Medical Group Inc., 695 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1985).
119. Id. at 165.
120. Id. at 166.
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schedule for all areas of practice.' ' . The next argument proffered by
the plaintiff was that section 6146 violated the equal protection clause
of California's constitution. Here, the Court held that the "Legislature
could rationally have believed that unregulated contingency fee
contracts - calling for potentially huge attorney fee awards if cases are
won - play at least some part in leading so many plaintiffs to pursue
malpractice claims that ultimately prove unsuccessful."' 22 Hence, the
legislature may have concluded that limiting contingency fees was an
appropriate way of protecting plaintiffs from excessively high
contingency fee arrangements which only diminish the plaintiff's
award 2
G. Sections 364 and 365, Notice of intention; time; law governing;
fictitious name; effect of failure to comply
These two sections require that no lawsuit for a medical malpractice
claim will be filed "unless the defendant has been given at least 90 days
prior notice of the intention to commence the action.' 124  The
defendant must be notified of "the legal basis of the claim and the type
of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries
suffered. 1 25 Although a violation of these sections does not mean that
the plaintiff loses his right to sue, there may be grounds for the State
126Bar of California to investigate the attorney and impose sanctions.
H. MICRA Conclusion
MICRA has become a national model for other states as well as the
federal government. MICRA allows injured plaintiffs to receive
unlimited relief for economic damages, while imposing a cap on non-
economic damages. The California Supreme Court applied a rational
basis test to determine whether the statutes were constitutional under
the California Constitution. Although MICRA has been redrafted by
121. Id. at 170.
122. Id. at 171.
123. Id. (citing Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 602-603
(Ind. 1980)).
124. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364 (West 2002).
125. Id.
126. HCLA, supra note 63.
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numerous other states, no one state has proven as successful as
California. Instead, various state supreme courts have stricken replica
MICRA Acts for violating state constitutions. One such state is New
Hampshire.
III. NEW HAMPSHIRE'S FAILED ATTEMPT TO REGULATE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
1, 127
In the case of Carson v. Hitchcock Clinic, Inc., the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found that legislative measures enacted "to address the
problems of the medical injury reparations system"'128 violated New
Hampshire's constitution. These measures were almost identical to
California's MICRA Act of 1975.
The legislature found, prior to enacting this legislation, that the cost
and size of claims posed a major threat to the state's health care
system.129  "Accordingly, RSA ch. RSA 507-C (Supp. 1979) was
intended to codify and stabilize the law governing medical malpractice
actions and to improve the availability of adequate liability insurance
for health care providers at reasonable cost. ' ' 3°
The legislation enacted by New Hampshire included a cap on non-
economic damage awards;"' standards for expert witness
qualifications;13' a statute of limitations; a requirement of notice to the
defendant by the plaintiff;33 collateral sources of compensation to
further reduce the non-economic recovery by the plaintiff;'3' and a
contingent fee scale for plaintiffs' attorney's fees.'35
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, although not oblivious to the
crisis surrounding New Hampshire's medical doctors, found that the
new legislation violated the state constitution. 36 The court held thatthe legislation unconstitutionally distinguishes medical malpractice
127. Carson v. Maurer, Inc., 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
128. Id. at 829.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 830.
131. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 507-C (1979).
132. See id. §§ 507-C:3, 507-C:3 I.
133. See id. § 507-C:5.
134. See id. § 507-C:7.
135. See id. § 507-C.
136. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 2 & 12.
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victims from victims of other forms of negligence.137 The court was
concerned that victims of other torts could receive unlimited recovery
whereas victims of medical malpractice were limited in their non-
economic loss awards to $250,000 or less as stipulated by the
legislation. 3 8
Another section of the New Hampshire legislation required a
testifying witness to have been an expert at the time the negligence
occurred, and the court had to find "that the witness was competent
and dully qualified to render or supervise equivalent care to that which
is alleged to have caused the injury, at the time that such care was
rendered."'3 9 The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that it is
reasonable and necessary that experts be competent to render the care
to which they are testifying.'9 However, the court found that "the
requirement that the witness be an expert in the field at the time the
defendant rendered the alleged negligent care does not substantially
further those objectives and places too burdensome a restriction on
medical malpractice claimants who require expert testimony.'
41
Consequently, the court invalidated that portion of the statute having
the greatest impact on expert testimony in medical negligence suits.
The state legislature may have gone too far by including this provision
in the statute, because it is possible that without this provision the
court would not have felt compelled to strike it down.
The state legislature also provided for a statute of limitations on
medical malpractice suits requiring a plaintiff to bring suit within two
years of the injury or two years from discovery of the injury. 42 If the
plaintiff was under age eight when the alleged negligence took place,
she had until her tenth birthday to bring suit under this legislation.
43
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that Section 507-C:4 of
the New Hampshire Revised Statutes was "invalid insofar as it makes
137. Carson, 424 A.2d at 832.
138. See § 507-C.
139. Carson, 424 A.2d at 832.
140. Id. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 507-C:3 1 (1979).
141. Id.
142. The statute states that if the
action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of the
injured person which is not discovered and could not reasonably have
been discovered within such 2-year period, the action may be commenced
within 2 years of the date of discovery or of the date of discovery of facts




the discovery rule unavailable to all medical malpractice plaintiffs
except those whose actions are based upon the discovery of a foreign
object in the injured person's body."' 44 The court also found that the
rule is unfair because it denies a plaintiff recovery before he had a
reasonable chance to discover the existence of the negligence .' The
New Hampshire Supreme Court boldly stated that "in all medical
malpractice cases in which the cause of action is not discovered and
could not reasonably be discovered during the applicable limitation
period, that period will not begin to run until the time the plaintiff
discovers both his injury and its cause."' 46 This statement by New
Hampshire's highest court reflects the view that if a plaintiff does not
discover the cause of an injury for many years, he should not lose the
right to sue simply because he could not identify the source of the
negligence.
The court then moved on to the notice requirement set forth in
Section 507-C:5 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes. This part of
the legislation required "that no action for medical injury shall be
commenced until at least sixty days after service upon the defendant,
by registered or certified mail, of a written notice.., setting forth...
the alleged injuries and damages claimed.' 47 The court acknowledged
that the legislative intent of the notice requirement was "to provide the
malpractice defendant with some sort of warning before the
commencement of expensive litigation,"'' 48 which would allow the
defendant to "evaluate the claim and consider the possibility of
settlement before costly litigation is undertaken.' 49  While
acknowledging that the legislature had a legitimate reason for
including a notice requirement, the court held that the legislature did
not have a legitimate objective for the notice requirement.5 The
court, in dictum, stated that the malpractice defendant has enough
time to decide to settle the suit after he is "served with process.'
5
'
Once served, the defendant can assess the plaintiff's stated claims and
decide whether he is willing to settle the claim immediately or if he
believes he was not negligent and can prove this in court. The court
believed allowing a notice requirement would only unjustly hinder
144. Carson, 424 A.2d at 833.
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 834.
148. Id.
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plaintiffs. 152  The court considered the notice requirement to be a
"procedural trap for the unwary and not an effective means to
encourage pretrial settlement or investigation,"'5 3  holding that this
"procedural hurdle', 5 4 had the ability to "prolong the time and increase
the cost of medical malpractice litigation' '5 5 because if a plaintiff does
not comply with the notice requirement, she then has the ability
(within one year) to file "a second suit to recover for [her] medical
injuries.' 5 6 For this reason the notice requirement has the ability of
postponing the time period over which a malpractice victim may
recover. Therefore, the court found that any benefit from the
legislation was outweighed by the restrictions it imposed on plaintiffs.
The court voided Section 507-C:5 because it found the statute to be
unconstitutional.
157
When considering the damages a plaintiff may recover, the court
reviewed the limit on non-economic damages, which was capped at
$250,000, and the plaintiff's compensation from collateral sources.
RSA 507-C:7 I (Supp.1979) provides that the defendant may
introduce evidence of the plaintiff's compensation from
collateral sources, that the plaintiff may then offer evidence of
any costs incurred in securing such compensation, and that the
jury shall be instructed to reduce the award.., by a sum equal to
the difference. 58
Collateral sources include workers' compensation as well as the
plaintiff's own insurance. The court stated:
Abolition of the [collateral source] rule . . . presents the
anomalous result that an injured party's insurance company may
be required to compensate the victim even though the negligent
tortfeasor is fully insured. Not only does this abolition patently
discriminate against the victim's insurer, it may eventually result
in an increased insurance burden on innocent parties.5 9
The court pointed out that this section prevented plaintiffs from fully
recovering the economic losses suffered by malpractice plaintiffs, when
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Carson, 424 A.2d at 835.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 834-835.
157. Id. at 835.
158. Id.
159. Carson, 424 A.2d at 835-36 (quoting R. Scott Jenkins and Win C.
Schweinfurth, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal
Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 948 (1979)).
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it allowed collateral sources to pay the medical bills of plaintiffs.' 6° The
state supreme courts of California and New Hampshire have taken
opposite views with regards to the collateral source rule. California
has taken a more liberal view while the New Hampshire Supreme
Court has decided not to differentiate between malpractice victims and
other tort victims.
The Carson court found the "relationship between the legislative
goal of rate reduction and the means chosen to attain that goal is weak
for two reasons: 'First, paid-out damage awards constitute only a small
part of total insurance premium costs. Second, and of primary
importance, few individuals suffer non-economic damages in excess of
$250,000. ,,16' As mentioned earlier, the court did not approve of
treating malpractice victims differently than other tort victims by
limiting the amount of recoverable non-economic damage.'62 The
court considered it "unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of
supporting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who
are most severely injured and therefore more in need of
compensation. '' 16 For all of these reasons, the court found the cap on
damages and the abolition of the collateral source rule invalid. The
court did state, however, that remittitur is always available to help curb
excessive awards by juries.
Attorney's fees were the final aspect of the legislation addressed by
the court. Section 507-C:8 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes
"establishes a contingent fee scale for attorneys representing parties in
medical injury actions. '165 The legislature implemented a contingent
fee scale in order to ensure that malpractice plaintiffs, not their
attorneys, received the bulk of the jury award. The court found that
"the regulation of attorney's fees solely in the area of medical
malpractice inevitably will make such cases less attractive to the
160. Id. at 836. The plaintiff will not recover in full because of another New
Hampshire state law, N.H. REV. STATE. ANN. §281:14 I & II (West 2003), gives
"the workmen's compensation carrier a lien on any damages recovered by the
plaintiff, less certain costs and expenses incurred by the plaintiff, up to the amount
pain in compensation benefits." Carson, 424 A.2d at 836 (citing Tarr v. Republic
Corp., 352 A.2d 708, 711 (N.H. 1976)).
161. Carson, 424 A.2d at 836 (quoting Jenkins & Schweinfurth, supra note 159,
at 951).
162. Id. at 836-837.
163. Id. at 837.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 839.
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plaintiff bar,"' ' and thus would unfairly discriminate against medical
malpractice plaintiffs.
6 1
As shown above, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that
although the legislature had a noble intent to curb the cost of medical
malpractice insurance in the late 1970s, they did not succeed. Instead,
the court found that the legislature singled out the medical malpractice
plaintiffs as opposed to other tort victims. Despite the strong
similarities between New Hampshire's legislation and California's
MICRA, the states' distinct constitutions and their judiciaries' unique
beliefs contribute to diverse legislative environments. For these
reasons, California was successful in their attempt to reform medical
malpractice suits while New Hampshire failed.
IV. FEDERAL RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL CRISIS
In response to the medical malpractice crisis reports issued by
numerous states, non-profit organizations, and physicians, President
George W. Bush endorsed the HEALTH Act of 2002.'6 Beginning in
mid-July 2002, the House of Representatives Energy and Commerce
Health Committee as well as the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Commercial and Administrative Law held hearings concerning this
crisis affecting the United States.6 9
166. Id.
167. Carson, 424 A.2d at 839.
168. Associated press, Bush to Address Malpractice Insurance Cost (July 25,
2002), available at cnn.com/health; see Press Release, ACOG, Ob-Gyns Support
President's Call for Medical Liability Reform Urge National, Bipartisan Solutions
(Jan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Ob-Gyns Support President], available at
www.acog.org/from home/
publications/press release/nrOl-16-03.cfm. The ACOG "applauded President
George W. Bush for addressing the nation's medical liability insurance crisis at a
roundtable discussion in Scranton, PA." Id. The HEALTH Act of 2002 (H.R.
4600) is identical in content and structure to the HEALTH Act of 2003 (H.R. 5).
169. See Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation:
Hearing Before the House Energy and Commerce Comm., 107' Cong. (2002)
(statement of Lauren Townsend) [hereinafter Townsend Statement]; see also
Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation: Hearing
Before the House Energy and Commerce Comm., 107"' Cong. (2002) (statement of
Mr. Stuart H. Fine, CEO, Grand View Hospital).
Medical Malpractice
A. The Opposition to Federal Legislation
Lauren Townsend, President of Coalition for Consumer Justice
(CCJ),' 70 testified in front of the House of Representatives Energy and
Commerce Committee on July 17, 2002,'17' arguing against the passage
of the HEALTH Act (H.R. 4600). Ms. Townsend and her
organization "vehemently oppose H.R. 4600' ,72 and believe that the
proposed legislation, if passed, would "immunize wrongdoers and be a
boon for the monolithic giant that should be the target of everyone's
ire: the insurance industry."
' 7
Ms. Townsend urged Congress to adopt measures which would hold
doctors accountable to their patients and their fellow doctors when
they are negligent. This would involve "strong sanctions from
medical review boards," '75 safer prescription technology which would
automatically check prescriptions against a patient's record and his or
176her known allergies, as well as reasonable schedules for all doctors
and nurses working in hospitals to lower the risk of medical error.177
In addition to Ms. Townsend's recommendations to the
congressional committee, she also indicated that limiting the non-
economic compensation to $250,000 is an "arbitrary and paternalistic
price tag hung on another person's life. And this is wrong.
178
Even Democrats, who generally agree that there is a problem, take
issue with capping the amount of money that can be awarded to a
victim of medical malpractice. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy
of Massachusetts has argued that "[rlecent premium increases have
been an attempt to maintain high profit margins despite sharply
170. The mission of Citizens for Consumer Justice is as follows: "Citizens for
Consumer Justice (CCJ) is a nonprofit, social welfare organization founded in the
summer of 1997 to promote economic, racial, social, civil and environmental
justice through citizen action and campaigns to educate the public. CCJ has
become the leading nonprofit consumer rights organization in Pennsylvania."
Information available at www.ccjustice.org/aboutccj.htm (last visited May 14,
2004).
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declining investment earnings."1 79  These Senators stress the
importance of looking at the entire picture in order to ensure that
when Federal legislation is enacted it will help doctors be more
accountable to their patients and their profession while lowering
malpractice insurance premiums that doctors pay.18°
CCJ, Public Citizen, and trial lawyers are just a few of those
speaking out against medical liability reform. However, at the
Congressional hearings many of the voices heard were proponents of
the HEALTH Act, speaking of benefits they hope it will provide to
doctors, patients, health care providers, and insurance companies.
B. Supporters of Federal Legislation
Testifying before the committee the same day as Ms. Townsend was
Dr. Richard Anderson,"" the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of The
Doctor's Company,8 one of the forty-five doctor-owned and/or
operated medical liability insurers that comprise the Physician Insurers
Association of American (PIAA).'8' These organizations collectively
insure over sixty percent of the nation's practicing physicians. Dr.
179. Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical Litigation: Joint Hearing Before
Comm. on the Judiciary and the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions,
108"' Cong. (2003) (statement of Senator Edward Kennedy).
180. Id.
181. Anderson statement, supra note 49.
182. The mission of the Doctor's Company is designed to help
doctors understand the issues and advances that affect them, across every
specialty, nationwide[. This] is the most effective way we know to limit
their liability risk. As America's first national, physician-owned medical
malpractice carrier, we've cultivated a uniquely informed perspective on
the special needs, emerging national trends, and special challenges doctors
face every day.
The Doctor's Company website available at http://www.thedoctors.com (last
visited May 14, 2004).
183. "The Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA) is a trade
association of more than 60 professional liability (medical malpractice) insurance
companies owned and operated by doctors and dentists. Collectively, these
companies insure approximately 60 percent of America's private practice
physicians, as well as dentists, hospitals, and other healthcare providers." Mission
statement at www.thepiaa.org/about-piaa/what-is piaa.htm (last visited May 14,
2004).
184. Anderson Statement, supra note 49.
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Anderson reviewed with members of Congress the two other medical
liability crises that have taken place in the United States in the last
thirty years. The first medical malpractice crisis took place in the
mid-1970s, and the second ten years later in the mid-1980s.186 The first
crisis in the mid-1970s came about mainly because of the rapid increase
in new medical technologies and the use of general pharmaceuticals
coupled with a decline in insurance companies' investment revenue.
1 87
The crisis in the mid-1980s was due mainly to the same causes, coupled
with insurance companies' inability to raise insurance premiums9
Alongside the Doctor's Company was the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG),189 which "fully supports
President Bush's attempt to deal with a national crisis through Federal
legislation."' 90 The ACOG fears that if the federal government does
not step in and help doctors, women's health will be in jeopardy.
The ACOG is fearful that "[w]ithout insurance, ob-gyns are forced
to stop delivering babies, stop surgical services, or close their doors.
Pregnant women and newborns are hurt the most.1 9. In the states
which the ACOG claimed were in a state of "Red Alert," a recent
survey indicates "that in Pennsylvania, 18.6 percent of respondents
said they have dropped obstetrics due to the liability insurance
situation, and over 13 percent have decreased the number of high-risk
obstetrics cases they take. Over thirteen percent have decreased
gynecologic surgery and more than ten percent have stopped major
gynecologic surgery."' '  These are not just numbers. They are
185. See id.
186. The Council of State Governments, The Medical Malpractice Crisis in the
States, at http://www.csg.org/NR/rdonlyres/emenpj434dxvfgkn7evch2nqwgxx3jtwn
asay6lkqckjauk77p7p4j6jetmqivtysehnnxulcvpnaby7g6tu521ro6a/Taylor+Med+Ma
practice+ppt.ppt (last visited May 3, 2004).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The ACOG today has over 45,000 members and is the nation's leading
group of professionals providing health care for women. The ACOG is based in
Washington, DC, and is a private, voluntary, nonprofit membership organization.
See http://www.acog.org/from-home/acoginfo.cfm (last visited May 14, 2004).
190. Press Release, ACOG, ACOG Lauds President Bush for call for Liability
Reform; Ob-Gyns Urge Federal Response to the Professional Liability Insurance
Crisis (July 30, 2002), available at www.acog.org/from-home/publications/press
_releases/nr07-30-02.cfm [hereinafter ACOG Lauds].
191. Ob-Gyns Support President, supra note 168.
192. Id.
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patients' lives that are now at a greater risk for complications and
possibly even death.
The HEALTH Act is modeled after California's MICRA; therefore,
in order to fully understand the HEALTH Act, a full analysis of a state
statute which has not been able to withstand state constitutional
challenges and a look at the MICRA Act is necessary before analyzing
the federal legislation.
C. Constitutional Concerns
Recent Federal legislation has been modeled after California's
MICRA and will overcome any State constitutional problem but will
certainly face federal constitutionality challenges.
First, it is necessary to ask whether Congress has the power to enact
legislation such as the HEALTH Act. In Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council,'93 the Supreme Court found that "[a] fundamental
principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt
state law."' 94 The Court found that even though there is no express
provision for preemption in the Constitution, "When Congress intends
federal law to 'occupy the field,' state law in that area is preempted."'95
Hence, if the HEALTH Act is enacted into law by Congress then it
will preempt any previously written or future plans for state legislative
action.
Many Democratic House of Representative members' 96 are
concerned that the HEALTH Act may be unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh
Amendment. These members first claim that Congress' ability to
enact legislation such as the HEALTH Act is questionable when
applied to intrastate medical and hospital services. They point to
Section 2 of the Act19 and are dismayed at the unsubstantiated finding
193. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371 (2000).
194. Id.
195. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 206 (9th ed. 2001).
196. John Conyers, Jr.; Rick Boucher; Jerrold Nadler; Robert Scott; Melvin
Watt; Sheila Jackson Lee; William Delahunt; Robert Wexler; Tammy Baldwin;
Anthony Weiner; Linda Sanchez [hereinafter Critics].
197. Section 2(a)(2) of the bill states:
Congress finds that the health care and insurance industries are industries
affecting interstate commerce and the health care liability litigation
Medical Malpractice
by Congress that the bill regulates interstate commerce. They question
how medical treatments that take place in one state can be called
"interstate commerce." This is a constitutional argument which has
been recited by many Democratic members of Congress.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law," 19 8a proscription
which has been held to include an equal protection component.
199
Victims of medical malpractice will doubtlessly argue that the Act does
not provide a legislative quid pro quo and, as such, violates the Fifth
Amendment.
Finally, the bill may violate the Seventh Amendment, which
provides, "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."2°°
The bill eliminates the right of a jury to determine the proper amount
of punitive and non-economic damages, which some argue deprives a
plaintiff of the right to have a jury determine what a victim of
malpractice deserves for pain and suffering. These problems are
highlighted by the fact that courts in some states that have enacted
similar liability limitation laws, such as caps on non-economic damages
and collateral source offsets, have ruled such reforms unconstitutional
as violative of equal protection, due process, and the right to a trial by
jury and access to courts. °1
systems existing throughout the United States are activities that affect
interstate commerce by contributing to the high costs of health care and
premiums for health care liability insurance purchased by health care
system providers.
The Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act of 2003, H.R. 5,
108th Cong. §2(a)(2) (2003).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
199. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause found to incorporate equal protection guarantees in case involving public
school desegregation by the Federal Government in the District of Columbia).
200. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
201. Specifically, thirty-one states (AL, AZ, CA, CO, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, KS,
KY, LA, MO, NE, NH, NM, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX,
UT, WA, WI, WY) have ruled that such sweeping restrictions on the rights of
medical malpractice victims are unconstitutional. Courts in twenty states (AL, CO,
FL, GA, ID, IL, KS, NE, NH, ND, OH, PA, OK, OR, SC, SC, TX, UT, WA, WI)
have ruled caps or limitations on medical malpractice damages to be
unconstitutional. Courts in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania have ruled that
statutory limitations on attorney's fees in medical malpractice cases are
20041
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However, supporters of the HEALTH Act would allow for an
injured patient, or their family members, to receive unlimited
economic damages such as lost wages and all future medical expenses
paid.20 2 Although there would be a cap on the patient's recovery for
non-economic damages,2 3 which mainly include pain and suffering,
supporters claim that plaintiffs still have access to the courts and the
amount victims can recover in economic damages is unlimited.2 °"
The HEALTH Act also allocates to the defendants "that party's
several share of any damages only and not for the share of any other
person., 205 The trier of fact maintains the responsibility to sever the
total amount of compensation amongst the various parties to the suit.
2 6
Also, damages will still be assessed by juries. Juries will not be
instructed on the $250,000 limit on non-economic damages. 20 7 Instead,
an award exceeding that allowed by law would be reduced by the judge
to comply with the federal law.2°8
Attorney's fees are also covered by the HEALTH Act, which has
taken the California model of attorneys' fees20 9 allowing for a larger
percentage of legal fees to be paid on lower recoveries. The
percentage of the total award received by the victim paid to attorneys
slowly decreases as the recovery amount of the plaintiff increases.2 0
The HEALTH Act also provides that collateral source benefits can
be introduced as evidence during a trial,211 but that "[n]o provider of
collateral source benefits shall recover any amount against the
claimant or receive any lien or credit against the claimant's recovery or
be equitably or legally subrogated to the right of the claimant in a
health care lawsuit.,
212
unconstitutional, unfairly burdening medical malpractice victims and their lawyers,
or resulting in an unconstitutional infringement on the right to jury trial.
202. H.R. 5 §4(b).
203. Id. The cap on non-economic damages, commonly called pain and
suffering or punitive damages, is $250,000 per victim.
204. Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical Litigation: Joint Hearing Before
the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions, 1081h Cong. (2003) (statement of Dr. Shelby L. Wilborn, ACOG).




209. See id. §5(a); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 6146 (2002).
210. H.R. 5 §5(a); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 6146 (2002).




There are currently two main schools of thought on how to fix the
current medical malpractice liability crisis. First, the supporters of the
HEALTH Act of 2003 want to see federal legislation enacted to cope
with the radically high insurance premiums that are facing thousands
of doctors around the country. Supporters of the Act tend to be
Republicans, doctors, insurance companies,2 5  and doctors'
216lobbying groups. 16 Those who support enacting federal legislation
continue to fight and raise awareness around the country, with the
intent of ensuring that the voters as well as lawmakers understand the
desperation felt by thousands of doctors as they are forced to either go
to a state that has some form of a cap or to retire early.
The main issue that those who do not support the HEALTH Act
have with the federal legislation is the low cap that it places on non-
economic damages. Critics of the legislation worry that everyday
people, the patients of doctors, will lose their voice if juries are not
able to deliver verdicts that send a powerful message to doctors.1 7
Those who do not support the HEATH Act believe that courts are a
"place for ordinary people to be heard, often when other institutions
have failed them., 218 Senator John Edwards (D-NC), for example, is
afraid that the HEALTH Act would restrict access to courts. Instead,
Edwards believes that medical malpractice attorneys "should have to
bring their cases to independent experts who certify that the
complaints have merit before they are filed. And lawyers who bring
frivolous cases should face tough, mandatory sanctions with a 'three
strikes' penalty., 219 It is a solution like this that many critics of the Act
may be willing to support. Critics of HEALTH Act include legal
213. President George W. Bush, Senator Judd Gregg, Chairman of the Senate
Comm. On Health, Education, Labor and Pensions; and Senator Bill First are all
vocal supporters of H.R. 5.
214. See supra Part I.
215. See, e.g., Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical Litigation: Joint
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Comm. on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions, 108' Cong. (2003) (statement of Jose Montemayor,
Commissioner of Insurance for Texas).
216. One of the leading supporters of H.R. 5 is the ACOG.
217. Senator John Edwards, Juries: 'Democracy in Action,' NEWSWEEK, Dec.
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220 221organizations, many Democrats, patients, and victims of medical
malpractice.
In the end, the only thing that supporters and critics of the Act
should be concerned about is whether there will be an obstetrician
available to deliver their child, their grandchild, or their friend's child.
If nothing is done, the question must be asked: who will deliver the
babies of today, the leaders of tomorrow?
220. See, e.g., Association of Trial Lawyers .of America website, at
http://www.atlanet.org/ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/press-room/FACTS/med
mal/medmal.aspx (last visited May 14, 2004).
221. See generally Critics, supra note 196.
